Crusader as Custodian for Strategic Municipal Lien Investments, LLC v. Charles E. Heyward, et al. A water lien was filed by the DC Water and Sewer Administration (WSA). Shortly thereafter, the DC Water and Sewer Authority (WASA) was formed as an independent authority and replaced WSA, taking over the Heyward property lien. The lien was conveyed and assigned numerous times. The most recent lien assignee, Crusader, filed a complaint to foreclose on Heyward's right of redemption on his property. The DC Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Crusader's complaint and the nullification of the lien since Crusader failed to notify Heyward of his right of redemption.

Court granted defendant District of Columbia's motion to fix reasonable attorney's fees. Plaintiff Redemptor Litium, LLC had purchased a tax sale certificate for 300 L Street, N.E. After Redemptor filed a complaint to foreclose on the right of redemption, DC cancelled the tax sale pursuant to DC Code §47-1366. The court stated that the presumptively reasonable "lodestar" amount for attorney's fees is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended (i.e. not excessive, redundant, or unnecessary) by a reasonable hourly rate (i.e. market rate in relevant community of similarly experienced and skillful attorneys). The number of hours reasonably expended does not necessarily equal the time actually expended. Although not required, the Court considered the Laffey Matrix and the 12 Johnson Factors to determine reasonable hourly rates of $285/hr for attorneys and $75/hr for legal assistants for this matter. Additionally, the Court ruled that time spent waiting in the courthouse for a case to be called is reasonably compensated at no more than half the attorney's hourly rate. Lastly, time spent by a legal assistant on administrative work (e.g. calculating billing hours) is not compensable. 12 Johnson Factors:

(1) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due acceptance of the case

(2) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;

(3) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;

(4) the "undesirability" of the case;

(5) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(6) awards in similar cases;

(7) the amount involved and the result obtained;

(8) the novelty and difficulty of the questions;

(9) the skill requisite to perform the legal service;

(10) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;

(11) the customary fee; and

(12) the time and labor required;

See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)

A lengthy opinion by Judge Duncan Peters affirming Magistrate Judge Beshouri's Order. Only one of several issues raised by the tax sale purchaser is fully addressed. Held: Regardless of whether payment has been made for the taxes sold at the tax sale, the interest thereon continues to accrue until redemption. "Redemption" includes the $300 pre-legal expenses and the attorneys fees and costs. Hence, interest is not tolled by payment of the taxes alone. DC's argument was that this puts into the hands of the plaintiff bar control over when "redemption" occurs. Court finds that this argument is refuted by the statute which requires the District to secure and oversee payoff, unless a release has been secured by the redeeming party and submitted to DC.

"a remaining contention by Plaintiff: whether interest should be calculated monthly based upon the full tax sale price (exclusive of surplus) and not what taxes happen to still be owing at the beginning of the month because of partial payments."

does not address the issue the Court appears still to be reviewing. Judge Duncan-Peter's reserved ruling on the issue of whether or not Aeon has "standing" to challenge the District's purported practice of "supplementing" refunds to make up the difference between what is collects from persons seeking to redeem and what is owed under 47-1361 to the tax sale purchaser. The Plaintiff's position is that it has standing and that what the District is doing is not supplementing the refund, but instead artificially precipitating redemption. That artifice reduces the length of time between the date of the tax sale and the date when a person seeking to redeem actually pays the correct amount and consequently reduces the interest to which the tax sale purchaser would be entitled or if not paid, the right to foreclose. .